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 Dynamex Is Dynamite, but Epic Systems Is 
Its Foil – Chamber of Commerce: The Sleeper 
in the Trilogy 
William B. Gould IV* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Disputes about whether individual workers are employees or independent 
contractors have emerged with increasing frequency as the twenty-first century 
has unfolded.1  Many of these disputes focus on the so-called “gig economy,” 
which is a labor market characterized by the flexibility and the prevalence of 
short-term work as opposed to permanent jobs.2  The Department of Labor 
refers to the gig economy phenomenon as providing alternative work arrange-
ments,3 while Audrey Freedman calls it the “contingent workforce.”4  In Eu-
rope, the gig economy is referred to as “atypical employment.”5 
Though the issue of the dependent laborer – a concept thus far judicially 
unrecognized in the United States – was addressed more than a half-century 
ago,6 the definition of what constitutes a gig economy has been described only 
 
* Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, at Stanford Law School, Stanford, 
California; Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board (1994–1998); and Chair-
man of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board (2014–2017).  I am grateful 
for research assistance provided by Neil K. Damron, Stanford Law School, J.D. ‘20; 
Earl Joyce Rivera-Dolera, Stanford Law School ‘18, LL.M in International Economic 
Law, Business and Policy. 
 1. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment 
in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1683–84, 1688 (2016). 
 2. See id. at 1684–88.  A gig economy is “[r]ooted in an economic model in which 
individuals sell service to one another, [and] online platforms help facilitate varied 
forms of peer-to-peer work.”  Id. at 1684. 
 3. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONTINGENT AND 
ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS – MAY 2017 1 (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf. 
 4. Louis Hyman, Where Are All the Uber Drivers? Not in These Government 
Statistics, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
hyman-contingent-temp-workers-20180729-story.html.  Audrey Freedman was a labor 
economist at the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Id.  She used the term “contingent work” 
for the first time in 1985 at a conference on employment security.  Id. 
 5. See Paul Schoukens & Alberto Barrio, The Changing Concept of Work: When 
Does Typical Work Become Atypical?, 8 EUR. LAB. L.J. 306, 312 (2017).  It is also 
known as “crowdwork.”  Id. at 317 n.80. 
 6. See, e.g., H.W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal 
Problems of Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (1965); see also Marc 
Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Am-
biguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. 
1
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within the past decade.7  Traditionally, the gig economy has mostly been asso-
ciated with chance engagements in a variety of venues for a short duration8 – 
for example, labor lasting only for an evening, a weekend, or a week at clubs, 
restaurants, concert halls, shopping centers, open stadiums, and fairgrounds.  
Scholars best describe the gig economy as follows: 
The term “gig” originated in the music industry, where musicians go 
into the studio to record one song or play in a band for one performance.  
The musicians with such gigs have no expectation of recording at the 
same studio the following day or playing with the same band the fol-
lowing night.  Borrowing from the music industry, we define “gig em-
ployment” as one-time jobs where workers are employed on a particular 
task or for a defined period of time . . . .  [A] gig worker is not paid a 
wage or salary; does not have an implicit or explicit contract for a con-
tinuing work relationship; and does not have a predictable work sched-
ule or predictable earnings when working.  Applying this definition, 
some sole proprietors, some independent contractors, and anyone who 
 
& POL’Y J. 187 (1999).  An earlier discussion of the British law on the subject is con-
tained in O. Kahn-Freund, Notes of Cases, Servants and Independent Contractors, 14 
MOD. L. REV. 505 (1951).  The Canadian situation is best summed up by Brian A. 
Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View 
from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7 (1999).  See also Judy Fudge et al., 
Changing Boundaries in Employment: Developing a New Platform for Labour Law, 10 
CANADIAN  LAB. & EMP. L.J. 329 (2003); Judy Fudge et al., Employee or Independent 
Contractor? Charting the Legal Significance of the Distinction in Canada, 10 
CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 193 (2003). 
  Some of the issues relate to relatively affluent professionals as well.  See Eliz-
abeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights 
for “Dependent Contractors”, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 155–60 (2005).  
For discussion on the contemporary scene, see Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Tak-
ing Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623 (2017); Mir-
iam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A 
Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635 (2017); Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Em-
ployed by an Algorithm: Labor Rights in the On-Demand Economy, 40 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 987 (2017); Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and La-
bor Law, 51 U. S.F. L. REV. 51 (2017) [hereinafter Lobel, Gig Economy & the Future]; 
Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577 (2016); Miriam A. Cherry, People Analytics and Invisi-
ble Labor, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2016); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016). 
 7. Gig Economy, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionar-
ies.com/definition/gig_economy (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) (describing the origin of 
“gig economy” as the “[e]arly [twenty-first] century”).  The Cambridge English Dic-
tionary defines “gig economy” as “a way of working that is based on people having 
temporary jobs or doing separate pieces of work, each paid separately, rather than work-
ing for an employer.”  Gig Economy, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cam-
bridge.org/us/dictionary/english/gig-economy (last visited Oct. 10, 2018). 
 8. See Lobel, Gig Economy & the Future, supra note 6, at 51–52. 
2
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is a day laborer or on-demand/platform worker should be considered a 
gig worker.9 
The description of this concept had its initial inspiration in the practice of 
musicians –disproportionately jazz musicians.10  But members of symphony 
often engaged in separate gigs beyond their “regular” work as well.11  This 
Article examines the concept of the independent contractor classification – a 
characterization at issue in early litigation involving the question of whether 
particular workers are employees or independent contractors.  It describes the 
early cases arising in transportation, including over-the-road trucking, the taxi-
cab industry, and package delivery companies like Federal Express (“FedEx”).  
The Article takes the position that the concept of flexibility, frequently used by 
employers to classify or reclassify employees as independent contractors, is a 
false justification for determining that employees are independent contractors.  
It also takes the position that engaging in part-time work for numerous employ-
ers is consistent with a finding of an employment relationship. 
The Article focuses upon a “trilogy of cases,” beginning with the Supreme 
Court of California’s unanimous, landmark decision in Dynamex Operations 
West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,12 which established a presumption 
in favor of employee status13 – a holding that has provoked considerable re-
sistance from the business community.14  The second case is the United States 
Supreme Court’s 5-4 majority decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,15 which 
sustained prohibitions against employee class actions by upholding binding in-
dividual arbitration clauses – or “unbargained-for”16 individual arbitration 
clauses, as Justice Ruth B. Ginsburg’s powerful dissenting opinion describes 
 
 9. KATHARINE G. ABRAHAM ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEASURING THE GIG 
ECONOMY: CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND OPEN ISSUES 10 (2017), https://ay-
sps.gsu.edu/files/2016/09/Measuring-the-Gig-Economy-Current-Knowledge-and-
Open-Issues.pdf. 
 10. See Lora Keenan, One Gig at a Time: Contract Lawyers and the New Econ-
omy, OR. ST. B. BULL., May 2018, at 16, 18. 
 11. See Lancaster Symphony Orchestra v. NLRB, 822 F.3d 563, 569–70 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016) (discussing the capability of symphonic musicians to “gig” with other sym-
phonies in the area and pursue teaching and other musical endeavors while still “gig-
ging” with the orchestra at hand). Cf. ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, THE PERILOUS LIFE OF 
SYMPHONY ORCHESTRAS: ARTISTIC TRIUMPHS AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES (2012). 
 12. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). 
 13. Id. at 40. 
 14. See generally Memorandum from DoorDash et al. to David M. Lanier, Sec’y 
of the Cal. Labor & Workforce Dev. Agency, & Keely Martin Bosler, Cabinet Sec’y to 
the Governor (July 23, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4639019-
Follow-Up-Letter-to-Secretary-Lanier-Keely.html. 
 15. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 16. Id. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
3
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them.17  The Article also discusses the transportation exemption from the 
strong pro-individual arbitration strictures of the Federal Arbitration Act of 
1925 (“FAA”),18 an issue recently addressed in United States Supreme Court 
in New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira.19  Finally, the third case, Chamber of Commerce 
v. City of Seattle,20 examines Seattle’s unprecedented ordinance21 that pro-
vided for collective bargaining for for-hire drivers, including taxicab drivers, 
as independent contractors and was deemed not to be preempted by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.22  The Article concludes that the court’s 
treatment of Seattle’s legislation under antitrust law is questionable but con-
tends that the court’s analysis has nonetheless established a roadmap for state 
legislation – an avenue opened more clearly by the court’s conclusion that state 
and local governments are not preempted by federal law and have authority to 
legislate in this arena.23 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS 
While traditional employment continues to be the rule rather than the ex-
ception, the advent of ride-sharing companies, like Uber and Lyft, as well as 
other gig companies, like TaskRabbit and Instacart, has raised concerns that 
the gig economy represents a new phenomenon that undercuts traditional em-
ployment through exploitation.  In 2018, a study conducted by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor reported that the number of workers who are characterized as 
independent contractors in today’s workforce had declined since 2005.24  The 
statistics for this category only included workers who were mainly or exclu-
sively independent contractors;25 thus, the study excluded workers who sup-
 
 17. Id. at 1632 (majority opinion) (“The policy may be debatable but the law is 
clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements like those before us must be 
enforced as written.”). 
 18. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 
amended at  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018)). 
 19.  See 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). See discussion of Oliveira infra notes 210–13 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 21. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 (Dec. 14, 2015). 
 22. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 781, 795 (finding “the Ordinance author-
izes a per se antitrust violation” and finding that the ordinance was not preempted). 
 23. Id. 
 24. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 6.  In May 2017, they note a 
6.9% total employment – the largest of any alternative work arrangements – in com-
parison with 7.4% in February 2005.  Id.; see also Ben Casselman, Maybe the Gig 
Economy Isn’t Reshaping Work After All, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/06/07/business/economy/work-gig-economy.html. 
 25. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 1 (“The measures of . . . alter-
native employment arrangements[, which includes independent contractors,] apply 
only to a person’s sole or main job.  For individuals with more than one job, this is the 
job in which they usually work the most hours.”). 
4
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plemented their primary income with a second or third job as independent con-
tractors.  Because the U.S. Department of Labor report was designed to exam-
ine only a worker’s primary work responsibilities, and thus only a general de-
cline in the alternative work arrangements was shown, the report did not pro-
vide insight into whether the slight decline was due to an expanding traditional 
labor market or to high levels of underreporting by individuals taking on inde-
pendent contractor work as a secondary source of income.26 
Despite the fact that, according to the U.S. Department of Labor re-
port, the number of workers characterized as full-time independent contractors 
has declined in recent years,27 the issues surrounding the gig economy remain 
more pertinent in our society than ever before.  Characterization of a worker as 
an independent contractor rather than an employee has several important im-
plications.  First, it may categorize gig workers as unemployed, therefore paint-
ing an erroneous national economic picture based upon flawed data and conse-
quent policy.28  Second, a worker who is characterized as an independent con-
tractor rather than an employee is excluded from the basic safety net policies 
created during the New Deal era of the 1930s – such as the Social Security Act 
of 1935 (“SSA”),29 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”)30 or 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”)31 – and further developed dur-
ing the New Frontier and Great Society eras of the 1960s.32  These legislative 
efforts, originating under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, were 
developed largely in response to perceived widespread unemployment and job 
shortages and included measures that were designed to increase the number of 
 
 26. See id. at 5–7 (evidencing decrease in three surveyed alterative employment 
arrangements since the 2005 study but not speculating on the cause). 
 27. Id. at 6.  As the result of this study, Professors Katz and Kreuger have con-
fessed error.  See Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger, Understanding Trends in 
Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 25425, 2019); Josh Zumbrun, ‘Gig Economy’ Authors Say Work 
Flawed, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 8, 2019). 
 28. See Mary Dorinda Allard & Anne E. Polivka, Measuring Labor Market Activ-
ity Today: Are the Words Work and Job Too Limiting for Surveys?, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., Nov. 2018, at 1. 
 29. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. ch. 7). 
 30. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as 
amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2018)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152 (defining “employ-
ees” covered under the NLRA and excluding independent contractors). 
 31. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–04, 206–07, 209–18, 218b, 218c, 219).  
 32. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“The term ‘employee’ 
means an individual employed by an employer” for purposes of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); cf. William B. Gould IV, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act at Fifty: 
Ruminations on Past, Present, and Future, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 369 (2014). 
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jobs available in the United States, to increase wages, and to decrease the length 
of the laborer’s average work week.33 
Under the New Deal, the SSA included provisions providing special as-
sistance to covered workers in the form of unemployment compensation,34 
while the FLSA, in its original form, “set the minimum hourly wage at [twenty-
five] cents[] and the maximum workweek at [forty-four] hours”35 and estab-
lished overtime hours during which employees must be paid.36  Although ini-
tially the FLSA only applied to a limited scope of industries, the successive 
economic and social reform efforts of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
B. Johnson in the New Frontier and the Great Society eras successfully ex-
panded the scope of the FLSA to encompass a broader range of industries, 
therefore allowing more employees to avail themselves of its protections.37 
The NLRA provided covered employees the right to “join together to im-
prove their wages and working conditions, with or without a union.”38  How-
ever, with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,39 the NLRA has re-
versed extant authority40 and circumscribed employee rights to a relatively nar-
row common law definition.41 
However, independent contractors do not enjoy the minimum wage and 
maximum hour benefits of the FLSA or the unemployment compensation pro-
visions of the SSA.42  Some states, however, provide special assistance for the 
 
 33. See Philip Harvey, An Analysis of the Principal Strategies That Have Influ-
enced the Development of American Employment and Social Welfare Law During the 
20th Century, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 677, 686–98 (2000). 
 34. Patricia P. Martin & David A. Weaver, Social Security: A Program and Policy 
History, Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 66 (Nov. 1, 2005), https://www.ssa.gov/pol-
icy/docs/ssb/v66n1/v66n1p1.html. 
 35. Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle 
for a Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/oasam/pro-
grams/history/flsa1938.htm#1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see also 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 
 37. Chapter 6: Eras of the New Frontier and the Great Society, 1961–1969, U.S. 
DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dolchp06.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2018). 
 38. Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-
we-protect/rights/employee-rights (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
 39. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. 
ch. 7). 
 40. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944), superseded by Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2(3), as recognized by Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 41. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258–59 (1968); Darden, 503 U.S. 
at 324–25.  The common law criteria apply to the definition of employer as well.  
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
 42. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. ch. 7). 
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self-employed and therefore in some instances gig workers.43  In addition, 
workers classified as independent contractors do not fall within the covered 
scope of the anti-discrimination legislation prohibiting discriminatory conduct 
on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, sexual orientation and age44 
or the Family and Medical Leave Act of 199345 and comparable statutes at the 
state level providing an employee with time off without pay.46 
Independent contractors constitute a sort of precariat class, which in-
cludes those working in part-time or unscheduled jobs.  In contrast to tradi-
tional jobs, independent contractor jobs frequently have a foreseeable expira-
tion date.  Benefits more likely available in the private sector to traditional em-
ployees, such as health care, sick pay, and vacations, are generally unavailable 
to the gig economy workforce.  However, “The effects of growing inequality 
and loss of worker power are shared by workers in the standard and nonstand-
ard jobs alike – stagnant wages, lack of access to workplace benefits, insuffi-
cient hours, wage theft, retaliation when trying to organize.”47  It is thought 
that this second tier of the workforce is responsible for static wage growth in 
the midst of a full employment economy, which has been present since at least 
2014.48 
New, successful rideshare companies, like Uber and Lyft, have undercut 
the taxicab industry, which already had their drivers characterized as independ-
ent contractors.  Ridesharing companies have been more lightly regulated than 
taxicabs in multiple ways.  First, greater latitude is accorded to ridesharing 
companies in the hiring of drivers.49  Second, ridesharing companies are not 
 
 42. See Andrew L. Yarrow, Opinion, Update Labor Laws to Meet Needs of ‘Gig’ 
Economy, S.F. CHRON. (June 10, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/open-
forum/article/Update-labor-laws-to-meet-needs-of-gig-12981182.php (“Nine states 
have started . . . Self-Employment Assistance programs.”). 
 43. Id.  
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). 
 45. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–2619, 2631–
2636, 2651–2654). 
 46. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 398–4 (West 2018). 
 47. Annette Bernhardt, Making Sense of the New Government Data on Contingent 
Work, U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (June 10, 2018), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/mak-
ing-sense-new-government-data-contingent-work/. 
 48. See Phillip Monar, How Much Does the Gig Economy Pay? It’s Complicated, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/busi-
ness/economy/sd-fi-labor-day-gig-20170705-story.html (“Estimates for how much 
someone can make in the gig economy vary wildly but there is typically one constant 
– pay is pretty low.”).  For an extensive discussion of the relationship to labor unions 
see Workers of the World, Log On! Technology May Help to Revive Organised Labor, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2018, at 23; cf. SARAH KESSLER, GIGGED: THE END OF THE JOB 
AND THE FUTURE OF WORK (2018). 
 49. See Checker Cab Operators, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 899 F.3d 908, 914 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (claiming “disparate regulatory frameworks,” taxicab license holders 
brought this list of treatment as a show of evidence).  Cf. Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc. v. 
7
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subject to hefty insurance coverage requirements.50  Third, ridesharing compa-
nies are permitted to conduct their own independent background checks, while 
taxicab companies must conduct greater background checks of its drivers.51  
Fourth, ridesharing vehicles are not required to undergo vehicle inspections.52  
Fifth, taxicabs have been “bound by more onerous vehicle-appearance stand-
ards.”53  And sixth, there have been maximum fare rates established for taxi-
cabs but not for ridesharing.54  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of this two-tier regulation, which has 
given advantages to ridesharing.55 
The well-chronicled consequences of unregulated ridesharing in New 
York City highlight the fact that these differences are hardly ephemeral but 
rather are more consequential.  Reputable studies have established that the 
wages of ridesharing and taxicab drivers, when one deducts all expenses asso-
ciated with running an automobile, do not amount to enough to for the drivers 
to afford even a modest lifestyle in New York City.56  In the case of ridesharing 
drivers, 
Nine out of [ten] drivers are immigrants and approximately [fifty-four] 
percent are responsible for providing more than half of their family in-
comes.  Beyond that, . . . the number of drivers for ride-hailing services 
 
City of Milwaukee, 839 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2016); Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of 
Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Beginning in the 1970s a deregulation 
movement swept the country, powered by the belief that competition is often superior 
to alternative regulation.  Entire agencies vanished, such as the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, which had greatly limited competition in the airline industry.  Many cities loos-
ened the regulatory limitation on taxi services—and this well before there were any 
[Transportation Network Providers (“TNPs”)] . . . .  The deregulation movement has 
surged with the advent of the TNPs.  Chicago, like Milwaukee in [the] companion San-
felippo case, has chosen the side of deregulation, and thus of competition, over preserv-
ing the traditional taxicab monopolies.  That is a legally permissible choice.”).  
50. Checker Cab Operators, Inc., 899 F.3d at 914.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 924. 
 56. See Ginia Bellafante, Uber and the False Hopes of the Sharing Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/nyregion/uber-nyc-vote-
drivers-ride-sharing.html (“[N]early two thirds of drivers who worked for ride-hailing 
services did so full time.  They held no other jobs; approximately [eighty] percent 
bought cars for the purpose of making a living by driving them.  Many were in debt 
from those acquisitions and making very little money.”); Winnie Hu, Taxi Medallions, 
Once a Safe Investment, Now Drag Owners into Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017). 
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grew [ten] times faster than the rate of blue-collar employment[] or em-
ployment in the city overall.  The gig, in effect, was the lifeline and the 
lifeline was insufficient. 57 
The outlook is even bleaker for taxicab drivers.  In New York City, the 
lifeline was so insufficient that within a period of six months, six drivers com-
mitted suicide, causing the unions, which purport to represent their interests, to 
decry “widespread exploitation.”58  The decline in profitability in the taxicab 
industry is so pervasive that, in 2018,  taxi medallions that were once valued at 
over $1 million dropped to a value as low as $175,000.59 
There have been two major responses to all of this by the state govern-
ments.  The first is a legislative response, as showcased through the Seattle 
ordinance discussed Chamber of Commerce below.60  The second and more 
recent response is New York City’s decision not only to curb the growth of 
ridesharing cars but also to establish a minimum wage of $17.22 after expenses 
are established for drivers.61  Defenders of the status quo, however, have pro-
tested the “burden of the loss of independent contractor’s status which . . . costs 
only [sixty-six] cents on the dollar for every hour worked for a full-time em-
ployee.”62 
 
 57. Bellafante, supra note 56. 
 58. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are Struggling. So Are Uber 
Drivers., N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/nyre-
gion/uber-taxi-drivers-struggle.html; cf. Holly Honderich, Will S.F.’s Reforms Save 
Troubled Taxi Industry?, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 13, 2018) (describing taxicab driver issues 
in San Francisco). 
 59. Id.  A taxi medallion is a mechanism that New York City used to restrict the 
number of cabs in business.  Joe Nocera, The Taxicab Bubble Couldn’t Last Forever, 
BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/arti-
cles/2018-06-19/uber-taxi-medallions-and-new-york-city-s-cab-bubble.  Drivers are 
required to buy a medallion in order to own a cab.  Id. 
 60. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 61. See Glenn Fleishman, New York Freezes Ride-Sharing Vehicles, Orders Min-
imum Wage for Uber, Lyft Drivers, FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2018), http://for-
tune.com/2018/08/08/new-york-freeze-ride-sharing-vehicles-minimum-wage-lyft-
uber/ (“The regulation didn’t specify a dollar amount, but a report presented to the city’s 
Taxi and Limousine Commission . . . suggested $17.22 an hour, which would be $15 
plus the overhead costs of operating a vehicle.”). 
 62. IAN ADAMS & BRIAN JENCUNAS, R STREET, ECONOMIC COSTS AND POLICY 
ALTERNATIVES TO CALIFORNIA’S DYNAMEX DECISION 3 (2018), 
https://2o9ub0417chl2lg6m43em6psi2i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/06/145.pdf; see also ROBERT HABANS, UCLA INST. FOR RES. ON LAB. AND 
EMPLOYMENT, EXPLORING THE COSTS OF CLASSIFYING WORKERS AS INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTORS: FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE SECTORS 1 (2015), http://www.bolletti-
noadapt.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IndependentContractorCost_20151209.pdf 
(“For the scenarios presented here, independent contractor status saves business be-
tween [twenty-nine] and [thirty-nine] cents for every dollar of pay – possibly more for 
certain classes of construction workers.”). 
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What else or what more can be done?  As Ginia Bellafante, a New York 
Times journalist, said, “What is astonishing about the current legislation is how 
tepid much of it actually is and how ferociously it was fought by the companies 
involved.”63  Both Dynamex and the legislative responses of Seattle and New 
York City constitute reasonable first steps to address the above noted rampant 
abuses promoted through the two-tier worker categorization of the gig econ-
omy.64 
III. LITIGATION RELATED TO THE EMPLOYEE-INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR STATUS 
Knowing how the law has evolved and developed on the question of sta-
tus in the workplace is important to understanding the current debate.  Section 
A of this Part details the early cases that attempted to differentiate between 
employees and independent contractors.  Section B examines a trilogy of recent 
cases that revisit this important question. 
A. The Early Cases – A Conflict of Interpretation 
The economic reality that independent contractor jobs are, in part, respon-
sible for stagnancy in wages present among the traditional workforce accounts 
for the host of litigation that has emerged in state courts across the nation, par-
ticularly in California,65 over whether workers are independent contractors or 
employees.  The actions are usually brought in state courts or before the Cali-
fornia Labor Commissioner by workers seeking recovery for minimum wage 
loss and overtime protection.66  State law, which is – for the most part – pred-
icated upon the restrictive common law criteria for defining “employee,” has 
 
 63. Bellafante, supra note 56. 
 64. See generally John Herzfeld, NYC Council Advances Bills Protecting Taxi, 
Ride-Hailing Drivers, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.bna.com/nyc-
council-advances-n57982093868/ (describing the most recent legislative initiatives in 
New York City); cf. Pippa Crerar, Gig Economy Workers’ Rights to be Given Boost in 
Overhaul, GUARDIAN, Nov. 8, 2018 (describing initiatives undertaken in Great Britain). 
 65. California is now the world’s fifth-largest economy, surpassing that of the 
United Kingdom.  Jonathan J. Cooper, California Now World’s 5th Largest Economy, 
Surpassing UK, USA TODAY (May 5, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/05/05/california-now-worlds-5th-largest-econ-
omy-beating-out-uk/583508002/. 
 66. See also, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see Ber-
wick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *1 (Cal. Dept. Lab. 
June 3, 2015).  See generally William B. Gould IV, The Future of the Gig Economy, 
Labor Law, and the Role of Unions: How Will They Look Going Forward?, in 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 70TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 2017: THE NEW 
WORLD OF WORK, 112–13 (2017). 
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produced uncertainty, lengthy litigation,67 and relief in the form of damages 
and attorneys’ fees and costs. 
In cases involving the right to organize under the NLRA, the National 
Labor Relations Board ( “NLRB”) has defined what constitutes an employee68 
and has determined that taxicab drivers are independent contractors and thus, 
as a practical matter, fall outside the protection of the NLRA, even though the 
industry is within its jurisdiction.69  In the 1990s, the NLRB interpreted the 
NLRA to include some truck drivers as employees.70  However, the NLRB 
continued to classify some truckers as independent contractors.71  It is now ever 
more apparent that the increased use of independent contractors in trucking has 
produced enormous inequality: 
Many truck drivers are paid on a per-mile basis, which means that some 
earn less than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour.  The eco-
nomics of trucking can be bleaker still for drivers who are classified as 
independent contractors.  Some even wind up owing trucking compa-
nies money because a truck lease, insurance, fuel and other expenses 
can add up to more than their per-mile reimbursement rate . . . .72 
Dominic Oliveira has firsthand experience with this problem . . . [as he] 
work[ed] for New Prime . . . in 2013 and 2014 [and spent] much of that 
time as an independent contractor.  Some weeks he owed the company 
. . . money after driving more than 1,000 miles.  He made so little that 
he could not always afford rent and he spent long stretches – six months, 
 
 67. The difficulties and limitations involved in this litigation have been chronicled 
in V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclas-
sification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739 (2017); 
see also Martin H. Malin, Protecting Platform Workers in the Gig Economy: Look to 
the FTC, 51 IND. L. REV. 377 (2018). 
 68.  29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018). 
69. See sources cited infra note 71.  
 70. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 854 (1998) (concluding that 
pick-up and delivery drivers are employees under the NLRA and not independent con-
tractors) (Chairman Gould, concurring). 
 71. Dial-a-Mattress, 326 N.L.R.B. 884, 894–95 (1998) (Chairman Gould, dissent-
ing).  Earlier, the NLRB and the courts had impeded trade union organizing in the taxi-
cab industry by virtue of their conclusion that taxicab drivers were frequently inde-
pendent contractors.  The leading cases here are NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs, 
702 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1983); Local 777, Democratic Union Org. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 
862 (D.C. Cir. 1978); and Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  
See also Veena Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, Regulation, 
& Labor Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi and Uber Economies, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 73 (2017) and Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur? Contesting the 
Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65 (2017).  But see NLRB v. 
Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008); City Cab Co. of Orlando, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 628 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
 72. Opinion, The Trouble with Trucking, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/11/opinion/sunday/the-trouble-with-trucking.html. 
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at one point – living out of his truck.  Mr. Oliveira’s contract said he 
was free to drive for other trucking companies but there were numerous 
conditions that bound him to New Prime.73 
Meanwhile, the plot thickened, as the independent contractor-employee 
dispute spread to the product packaging industry.  Most of the litigation leading 
up to 2018 has involved FedEx workers who had some measure of autonomy 
in deciding the speed and order in which their work was performed.74  In the 
final analysis, courts have held that the company required work in a particular 
time period and that the FedEx workers should have been properly regarded as 
employees.75  In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB,76 however, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the NLRB and held that 
FedEx drivers were independent contractors inasmuch as they could operate 
routes, hire additional drivers and helpers, and sell routes without permission.77  
In so reversing, the District of Columbia Circuit endorsed the view that the 
NLRB did not possess the “special administrative expertise” in the NLRA 
cases that normally applies.78  In so reasoning, the District of Columbia Circuit 
ignored the United States Supreme Court’s admonition that the NLRB’s posi-
tion should not be reversed where it involves a “choice between two fairly con-
flicting views.”79  The court focused on the level of entrepreneurial opportunity 
 
 73. Id.; see also New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).  This is a 
phenomenon that Steve Viscelli, a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania, de-
tailed in his 2016 book, STEVE VISCELLI, THE BIG RIG: TRUCKING AND THE DECLINE OF 
THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016). 
 74. See Gould, supra note 66, at passim. 
 75. Id. at 101–02. 
 76.  563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) [hereinafter FedEx I]. 
 77. See id. at 504. 
 78. See id. at 496 (quoting N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB., 869 F.2d 596, 598 
(D.C. Cir. 1989)); see also FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) [hereinafter FedEx II] (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 
(1968)) (“[T]he question whether a worker is an ‘employee’ or ‘independent contrac-
tor’ under [NLRA] is a question of ‘pure’ common-law agency principles ‘involv[ing] 
no special administrative expertise that a court does not possess.’”).  The court of ap-
peals in FedEx II held that, given the United States Supreme Court’s finding that no 
special administrative expertise was involved in these cases, “this particular question 
under the [NLRA] is not one to which we grant the [NLRB] Chevron deference . . . .”  
FedEx II, 849 F.3d at 1128; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If [a] statue is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 79. FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 496 (quoting C.C. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 
(D.C. Cir. 1995)); see also United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968).  Over time, the 
Court has established a set of standards for interpreting the NLRA.  See, e.g., Holly 
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398–99 (1996) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843) (“If a statute’s meaning is plain, the [NLRB] and reviewing courts ‘must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”); NLRB v. Town & Coun-
try Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 93–94 (1995) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 
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as the dominant factor to consider when making a determination that a worker 
is an independent contractor.80  Chief Judge Merrick B. Garland’s well-rea-
soned dissent instead stressed the role that control and the essential nature of 
the work performed to the employer’s business play in the analysis and ex-
pressed fidelity to the standard of deference mandated by the United States 
Supreme Court.81 
 
883, 891 (1984)) (“[W]hen reviewing the [the NLRB]’s interpretation of the term ‘em-
ployee’ as it is used in [the NLRA], we have repeatedly said that ‘[s]ince the task of 
defining the term employee is one that has been assigned primarily to the agency cre-
ated by Congress to administer the [NLRA], . . .  the [NLRB]’s construction of that 
term is entitled to considerable deference . . . .”); Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891; Charles 
D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 409 (1982) (“Congress’ refusal 
to intervene indicated that it intended to leave to the [NLRB’s] specialized judgment 
the resolution of conflicts between union and employer rights that were bound to arise 
in multiemployer bargaining.”); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) 
(“Of course, the judgment of the [NLRB] is subject to judicial review; but if its con-
struction of the statue is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely because 
the court might prefer another view.”); Beth Isr. Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 
(1978) (“The judicial role is narrow: The rule which the [NLRB] adopts is judicially 
reviewable for consistency with the Act, and for rationality, but if it satisfies those cri-
teria, the [NLRB’s] application of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole, must be enforced.”); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 
449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (“The function of striking that balance to effectuate na-
tional labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress 
committed primarily to the [NLRB], subject to limited judicial review.”). 
 80. FedEx I, 563 U.S. at 504 (“Because the indicia favoring a finding the contrac-
tors are employees are clearly outweighed by evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity, 
the [NLRB] cannot be said to have made a choice between two fairly conflicting 
views.”).  This ruling seems to be ignored in FedEx II.   FedEx II, 849 F.3d at 1128 
(“[T]his particular question under [NLRA] is not one to which we grant the Board 
Chevron deference . . . .”).  Of course, Chevron invokes the standards which the United 
States Supreme Court established for the NLRA itself in cases alluded to above.  See 
sources cited supra note 79.  The NLRB General Counsel has taken the position that 
misclassification is not inherently unfair labor practice.  Memorandum from Jayme L. 
Sophir, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. to John J. Walsh, Jr., Reg’l 
Dir., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/docu-
ment.aspx/09031d458275a5e9.  However, an administrative law judge has held to the 
contrary.  Velox Express, Inc. & Jeannie Edge, Case 15-CA-184006, 2017 WL 
4278501 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 25, 2017) (“Thus, where it is a ‘close call,’ agencies and 
courts should err on the side on finding employee status.”). 
 81. See FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 504–19 (Garland, J., dissenting).  Judge Garland pro-
tested the majority’s almost exclusive reliance upon the entrepreneurial opportunity as 
a basis for concluding that the drivers were independent contractors and noted that there 
was not an actual single instance of such opportunity.  Id. at 507.   Judge Garland said, 
“It is not unreasonable for the NLRB to take the position that a material number of 
workers must actually take advantage of an opportunity before it will conclude that the 
opportunity is significant and realistic rather than insubstantial and theoretical.”  Id. at 
517. 
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Curiously, in 2016, the very same court appeared to adopt the position 
established in Judge Garland’s dissent in its decision of Lancaster Symphony 
Orchestra v. NLRB.82  The Lancaster Symphony Orchestra case involved mu-
sicians employed on a regular basis by the Lancaster Symphony.83  Ordinarily, 
the musicians in question did not hire someone to serve in their place, although 
they were obliged to find replacements for last-minute cancellations.84  The 
District of Columbia Circuit noted that even though the musicians were able to 
back out of a series of programs and play for a higher-paying “gig” with an-
other symphony, the entrepreneurial opportunity was “limited” and provided 
“miniscule support” for the conclusion that they were independent contrac-
tors.85  The court stated that 
[u]nlike FedEx drivers, the Orchestra’s musicians – even with their abil-
ity to back out of a concert in order to take advantage of a more profit-
able gig – can increase their income only by accepting jobs with other 
employers.  Were this quite minor entrepreneurial opportunity given 
much weight, it might lead to almost automatic classification of many 
 
  Similarly, Judge Fletcher for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
has said, “There is no indication that California has replaced its longstanding right-to-
control test with the new entrepreneurial-opportunities test developed by the D.C. Cir-
cuit.”  Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc, 765 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
  I have long been of the view that the control attributable to government regu-
lation is irrelevant and should not be distinguished from employer control.  As I said, 
 
I would reverse current [NLRB] precedent and find that controls mandated by 
Governmental regulation should be considered probative of an employer-em-
ployee relationship. 
. . . [C]ontrols placed by the employer upon workers are indicative of an em-
ployment relationship, regardless of whether the employer imposes the controls 
because of [g]overnment regulation or for independent business reasons. 
. . . . 
  It is true that the [g]overnment is the source of the regulations and that the 
carriers have no choice but to impose the regulations if they wish to do business.   
However, it is also true that the [g]overnment does not directly interact with the 
drivers or owner-operators. 
. . . . 
[T]hat, in my view, is the heart of the matter.  To the extent that the [g]overn-
ment sets regulations, it relies on the carriers to impose and enforce them.  The 
only “face” the drivers see is that of the carrier, not the [g]overnment.   The 
reality of such a situation is that of an employment relationship where the carrier 
has significant control over the drivers’ job performance. 
 
Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 NLRB 842, 854–55 (1998) (Chairman Gould, con-
curring). 
 82. 822 F.3d 563 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 83. Id. at 564. 
 84. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 822 F.3d at 569. 
 85. Id. at 570. 
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part-time workers as contractors.  Yet as the [NLRB] explained, “[p]art-
time and casual employees covered by the [NLRA] often work for more 
than one employer.86 
This Article argues that Lancaster Symphony Orchestra is at odds with 
portions of the court’s reasoning in FedEx Home Delivery, given that the latter 
gave weight almost exclusively to the entrepreneurial opportunity.  As noted, 
Lancaster Symphony Orchestra allows for entrepreneurial opportunities that 
might exist through a “gig” with another employer.  This is a theme that 
emerges anew in some of the ridesharing cases involving Uber and Lyft.87  The 
fact is that many casual or part-time employees are similarly situated to musi-
cians in Lancaster Symphony Orchestra and will work for a number of em-
ployers.  The District of Columbia Circuit noted this critical point in Lancaster 
Symphony Orchestra, where it affirmed the NLRB’s conclusion and held that 
the exclusion of workers as employees on the ground that they are part-time or 
casual is inconsistent with the NLRA’s coverage.88 
Moreover, the idea of a “prohibition on moonlighting” is unknown today 
– indeed, even the word itself is strange to most millennials.  The term moon-
lighting was taken from the practice of working a second job by the light of the 
moon, which – a half century ago – was regarded as irregular.89  For instance, 
when employers unsuccessfully sought to exclude “salt” employees – persons 
getting a job at a specific workplace with the intent of organizing a union – 
from their workforce, they did not contend that a policy against “serving two 
masters” applied to other employers besides unions.90  This is because the prac-
tice of employment with more than one employer has become widespread, 
 
 86. Id. (citing Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 357 NLRB 1761, 1765 (2011)). 
 87. In the ridesharing context, control is more sophisticated and autonomy in terms 
of schedules and ability to work elsewhere substantial.  See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 
60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Gould supra note 66, at 90; see also Noam 
Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technol-
ogy/uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html. 
 88. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 822 F.3d at 565, 570. 
 89. See Moonlight, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/moonlight (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 90. Here the union acted as an employer because the union employed “salts” to 
organize employers.  See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 96 (1995); 
see also, e.g., Architectural Glass & Metal Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.3d 426, 432–33 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (an employer may lawfully adopt neutral policy against moonlighting if there 
is no discriminatory intent against the union); Tualatin Elec., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1237, 
1237, 1241 (1995) (holding that employer’s no-moonlighting policy violated NLRA 
because it was enacted to avoid hiring salts).  Arbitration decisions from the 1950s and 
1960s have established the principle that moonlighting itself is not just cause for dis-
charge short of the moonlighting employee negatively affecting the business interests 
of the primary employer.  See, e.g., Firestone Retread Shop, 38 BNA LA 600, 601 
(1962); Janitorial Serv., Inc., 33 LA 902, 908–09 (BNA 1959).  
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moving beyond the traditional “moonlighting” practice that employers at-
tempted to prohibit based on concerns that employees were not well-rested. 
Because of the demise of such employer practices, the phenomenon of 
working for more than one employer cannot be viewed as dispositive on the 
employee-independent contractor issue.  Flexibility in hours is something fre-
quently associated with employee status as well as independent contractor sta-
tus.  This point was duly noted by both the NLRB and the District of Columbia 
Circuit in Lancaster Symphony Orchestra.91  A fundamental problem with the 
early case law was that its reference to numerous criteria – such as entrepre-
neurial opportunity and flexibility in hours – lacked clarity that the parties 
could rely upon and provided an opportunity for judicial predilections.  As a 
result of these cases, it became clear that the criteria should (1) be simplified 
to be more easily understandable and to act as guidance and (2) promote pro-
tection for workers in trucking, ridesharing, and elsewhere who are exposed to 
bad working conditions that promote inequality.  The problem with the NLRA, 
however, is that its Taft-Hartley legislative history has locked labor and man-
agement into the more numerous and thus imprecise common law standards.92 
B. The 2018 Independent Contractor-Employee Trilogy 
In early 2018, the federal and state courts handed down several decisions 
that will have a major impact upon the independent contractor-employee legal 
arena.  The first of them, Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County,93 decided by the Supreme Court of California, provided 
a strong framework for determining whether drivers are independent contrac-
tors or employees and also provided a favorable ruling on the question of 
whether workers wishing to challenge their status can do so through class ac-
tion litigation.94  In the second ruling, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,95 the 
United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that binding arbitration 
agreements mandating that all employees waive their ability to utilize class ac-
tions in disputes with their employers – a tactic that has been frequently used 
in employment contracts96 – are enforceable under the FAA;97 however, Jus-
tice Ginsburg, in her dissent, characterized this tactic as “unbargained-for.”98  
The third ruling, Chamber of Commerce v. Seattle,99 which arose in Washing-
ton, involved the question of whether legislation enacted at the municipal level 
 
 91. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 822 F.3d at 568. 
 92. See supra notes 39–41. 
 93. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). 
 94. See generally id. 
 95. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 96. Id. at 1634. 
 97. Id. at 1624–29. 
 98. Id. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 99. 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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that “authorize[d] a collective-bargaining process” between ridesharing com-
panies, such as Uber and Lyft, and independent contractors who worked for 
those companies as drivers could stand in light of both federal antitrust law and 
labor law standards set forth by the NLRA.100   
It is difficult to estimate which of these decisions is the most important; 
but because Dynamex was heard by the Supreme Court of California and Epic 
Systems was heard by the United States Supreme Court, both have the potential 
to be lasting.  The Supreme Court of California ruling was significant because, 
unless eviscerated by special interest political pressure in 2019 and beyond, it 
will result in a major, positive transformation of many employment relation-
ships within California – which has the fifth largest economy in the world – by 
allowing drivers to challenge their status as independent contractors as a class 
rather than as individuals.101 
But the United States Supreme Court’s Epic Systems decision takes much 
of this positive impact of Dynamex away, except possibly in some aspects of 
transportation, as developed below.102  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Chamber of Commerce, while interpreting antitrust law in a manner 
that accepts the essential contention of the new ridesharing companies – i.e., 
that there are new sectors of the economy not contemplated or addressed by 
existing state statutes103 – nonetheless paves the way for state regulation of in-
dependent contractors who are not characterized as employees through rejec-
tion of NLRA preemption.  The preemption doctrine strips jurisdiction from 
the states and provides a roadmap under federal antitrust law. Under the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion, however analytically flawed, the way is open for the new 
legislation by states that wish to promote collective bargaining in the independ-
ent contractor arena. 
1. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of the Los Ange-
les County 
In Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of the Los Angeles 
County, 104 the first of these three groundbreaking decisions, Chief Justice Tani 
G. Cantil-Sakauye, writing for a unanimous court, held that, in the California 
wage order context, a worker will be presumed to be an employee rather than 
an independent contractor unless the business meets several criteria proving 
otherwise, known as the “ABC” test.105 
Dynamex is a nationwide, same-day courier service that operates a num-
ber of business centers in California and has large corporate customers, such 
 
 100. Id. at 775–76. 
 101. Cooper, supra note 65. 
 102. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 103. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 784–85 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 104. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). 
 105. See generally id.   
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as Office Depot and Home Depot.106  Drivers were converted into independent 
contractors in order to generate economic savings; thus, drivers were “required 
to provide their own vehicles and pay for all their own transportation expenses, 
including fuel, tolls, vehicle maintenance, and vehicle liability insurance, as 
well as all taxes and workers’ compensation insurance.”107  The ultimate issue 
before the court was whether the classification of the drivers as independent 
contractors violated California wage orders related to California minimum 
wages and overtime pay, as well as unlawful business practices under state 
law.108 
In Dynamex, “two individual delivery drivers, suing on their own behalf” 
as well as a class of similarly situated drivers in one action, protested their 
classification as independent contractors.109  The “[d]rivers of Dynamex [were] 
generally free to set their own schedule but [had to] notify” the company a 
number of days in advance.110  The drivers paid for a cellular telephone to con-
tact Dynamex.111  The drivers were assigned deliveries by the dispatchers at 
Dynamex’s sole discretion and had no guarantee on the number and type of 
deliveries they would be offered.112  The drivers could choose the sequence by 
which they made deliveries, however, like FedEx drivers, they were required 
to make the delivery on the day of assignment.113 
The Supreme Court of California premised its discussion by noting that, 
in some circumstances, “classification as an independent contractor [could] be 
advantageous to [a] worker[] as well as to [an employer] . . . .114  The court 
stated that 
the risk that workers who should be treated as employees may be im-
properly misclassified as independent contractors is significant in light 
of the potentially substantial economic incentives that a business may 
have in mischaracterizing some workers as independent contractors.  
Such incentives include the unfair competitive advantage the business 
may obtain over competitors that properly classify similar workers as 
employees and that thereby assume the fiscal and other responsibilities 
and burdens that an employer owes to its employees.  In recent years, 
the relevant regulatory agencies of both the federal and state govern-
ments have declared that the misclassification of workers as independ-
ent contractors rather than employees is a very serious problem, depriv-
ing federal and state governments of billions of dollars in tax revenue 
 
 106. Id. at 8. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 5, 9. 
 109. Id. at 5. 
 110. Id. at 8. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 5. 
 114. Id. 
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and millions of workers of the labor law protections to which they are 
entitled.115 
As a preliminary matter, the court was asked to determine whether the 
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations116 decision – 
Supreme Court of California precedent that was long characterized within the 
state as “embodying the common law test or standard for distinguishing em-
ployees and independent contractors” – was the only appropriate “standard” 
under California law for resolving the independent contractor issue.117  In Dy-
namex, the court determined that the preexisting Borello approach regarding 
employees and independent contractors focused primarily upon the scope and 
purpose of the particular statutory scheme involved and was not “limited by 
common law principles,” as the Borello court had once stated.118 
In Dynamex, the Supreme Court of California adopted the “suffer or per-
mit to work” definition of the employee for the purposes of state law,119 which 
is a more expansive approach to coverage principally associated at the national 
level with the cases addressing the FLSA.120  In Dynamex, the court held that 
the “suffer or permit to work standard is relevant and significant in assessing 
the scope of the category of workers that the wage order was intended to pro-
tect.”121  Accordingly, the court explained that the “suffer or permit to work” 
standard allows the exclusion of a worker as an independent contractor only if 
the worker is the type of traditional independent contractor – such as an 
independent plumber or electrician – who would not reasonably have 
been viewed as working in the hiring business.  Such an individual 
would have been realistically understood . . . as working only in his or 
her own independent business. 
The federal courts, in applying the suffer or permit to work standard set 
forth in the FLSA, have recognized that the standard was intended to be 
broader and more inclusive than the preexisting common law test for 
distinguishing employees from independent contractors, but at the same 
time, does not purport to render every individual worker an employee 
rather than an independent contractor.122 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). 
 117. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 19, 25 (citation omitted). 
 118. Id. at 19 (italics omitted) (quoting S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc., 769 P.2d at 405). 
 119. Id. at 26. 
 120. Id. at 33. 
 121. Id. at 30.  This is why the “suffer or permit to work” standard in California 
wage orders “finds its justification in the fundamental purposes and necessity of the 
minimum wage and maximum hour legislation in which the standard has traditionally 
been embodied.”  Id. at 31–32. 
 122. Id. at 33 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
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The Dynamex court referenced the appropriateness of the economic real-
ities standard in its expansive protection beyond the relatively restrictive com-
mon law standard and noted that a “multi-factor standard” possessed a substan-
tial number disadvantages – “particularly in the wage and hour context.”123  
The first of these disadvantages is that the standard is inherently vague, pro-
vides little guidance to both the worker and employer, and instead utilizes cri-
teria that result in “often considerably delayed judicial decisions.”124  Second, 
the standard incentivizes evasion of “fundamental responsibilities” by allowing 
an employer to “divid[e the] workforce into disparate categories and varying 
the working conditions of individual workers” so as to utilize the many circum-
stances which may be relevant.125  The court noted that 
a number of jurisdictions have adopted a simpler, more structured test 
for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors – 
the so-called “ABC” test – that minimizes these disadvantages.  The 
ABC test presumptively considers all workers to be employees, and per-
mits workers to be classified as independent contractors only if the hir-
ing business demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies each of 
three conditions: (a) that the worker is free from the control and direc-
tion of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both 
under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and (b) 
that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the 
hiring entity’s business; and (c) that the worker is customarily engaged 
in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the 
same nature as that involved in the work performed.126 
Thus, joining Massachusetts127 and New Jersey,128 the Supreme Court of 
California adopted the ABC test.129  The first criterion of the ABC test is con-
trol.130  Control is a longstanding requirement that was present in the common 
law definition of employee as well as the more recent NLRA decisions.131  The 
second criterion is that the work that is done must be “clearly comparable” to 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 34. 
 126. Id. (alteration in original).  See generally Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-
Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent 
Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53 (2015) 
(evaluating the many state jurisdictions have a place for a common law test with more 
simplified standards, which allow for less evasion than the common law test that was 
substituted for Hearst). 
 127. See Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 680 (Mass. 2018).  Cf. Fleece on 
Earth v. Departments of Employment and Training, 181 Vt. 458, 464 (2007). 
 128. See Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 463 (N.J. 2015). 
 129. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 35. 
 130. Id. at 36. 
 131. Id; see, e.g., Crew One Prods., Inc. v. NLRB., 811 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2016). 
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the work done in the ordinary course of business.132  This replicates the ap-
proach taken by the courts in employment cases transcending the independent 
contractor-employee scenario, where the employer seeks to subordinate a sec-
ond group of workers, hired on, for instance, on an annual renewal basis, with 
both groups performing the same task or functions.133  The third criterion 
– “that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the 
hiring entity” – is the most straightforward.134  For example, if the worker is a 
plumber and working for another plumber or an employer who conducts a sep-
arate business, then this third criterion would be satisfied.135 
The significance of Dynamex lies not only in its simplified approach to 
making independent contractor-employee determinations but also in its re-
quirement that the employer carry the burden with respect to each of the ABC 
test’s criteria.136  But there are also a host of unanswered questions that stem 
from the Dynamex decision.  The first question is whether the decision applies 
retroactively.  This is an issue of considerable consequence given the damages 
liability that would flow from retroactivity.137  If the decision applies retroac-
tively, defendants might argue that they relied upon other pro-employer criteria 
in good faith to side-step liability.138 
The second and more basic question is whether and to what extent the 
court’s holding in Dynamex applies to other employment controversies beyond 
the wage order context.  The court in Dynamex emphasized the application of 
the ruling to “wage orders,” and it seems clear that the new standard would 
apply to disputes about overtime and maximum hours as well as rest and meal 
periods inasmuch as those were the issues presented in the case.139  But the 
court specifically did not address the question whether employees could obtain 
 
 132. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 37. 
 133. Id.; see, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Kalksma v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols. U.S.A., Inc., No. CIV. 10-2829 DRD, 2011 WL 
3703471 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011); Oplchenski v. Parfums Givenchy, Inc., No. 05 CV 
6105, 2009 WL 440959 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009); Contracts – Independent Contractor 
Agreements – Ninth Circuit Finds That Misclassified Employees Are Eligible for Fed-
erally Regulated Employee Benefits, 111 HARV. L. REV. 609 (1997). 
 134. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 8. 
 135. Id. at 38–39. 
 136. Id. at 35. 
 137. See Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal.3d 973, 978 (2002) (“The gen-
eral rule that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect is basic in our legal tradi-
tion”).  Orange County Superior Court in California has also ruled Dynamex applies 
retroactively.  Johnson v. VCG-IS, LLC, No. 30-2015-00802813 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 25, 
2018) (deciding to apply the ABC test from Dynamex because the Court did not give 
directions to depart from the general rule that court decisions will apply to retroactive 
and pending cases). 
 138. William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Comment, Compelled Subsidies and the 
First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 203 (2018) (concluding that the good faith 
exception to retroactivity is substantially circumscribed). 
 139. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 5, 14. 
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reimbursement for expenses incurred, as that issue was not put forward.140  
Moreover, the question of whether the standard applies in workers’ compensa-
tion and in Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”)141 actions remains to be 
resolved.  Unless there is another basis for declining to extend Dynamex to 
other employment scenarios, the ABC test should apply in the interest of uni-
formity and the need for employers to conduct business under one standard. 
Litigation has been commenced in the wake of the case.142  Presumably, 
criterion A will likely be the easiest factor for the courts to apply.  Borello held 
that “[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person 
to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of 
accomplishing the result desired,”143 and the Dynamex decision appears to re-
tain control as critical.144 
Criterion B will likely be the most difficult factor for the courts to apply.  
This is because determining whether a job constitutes “same business” or 
“comparable work” may be more difficult for courts to quantify.  For example, 
consider a plumber or electrician who is hired at one particular outlet where 
such workers are not considered employees but another who is considered em-
ployed elsewhere. 
Criterion C will not be entirely without its difficulties either.  For instance, 
courts will be asked to determine the extent to which an independent trades-
person must be informally established as an independent enterprise.  In making 
such a determination, courts must consider whether the tradesperson’s business 
must be incorporated and whether there is a threshold advertising requirement 
associated with independent contractor status.  In addition, the court may be 
asked to answer complex, context-specific questions.  For example, if a retired 
electrician does work for an employer, would that retired electrician be deemed 
an independent contractor within the meaning of criterion C? 
 
 140. Id. at 7 n.5.  Subsequently, some courts have assumed that Dynamex does not 
apply to expense reimbursement.  Garcia v. Border Transp. Grp., LLC, 2239 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 360, 370–71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); Rosset v. Hunter Eng’g Co., No. A148819, 2018 
WL 4659498, at *3 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2018); Salgado v. Daily Breeze, No. 
B269302, 2018 WL 2714766, at *15 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2018); Karl v. Zimmer 
Biomet Holdings, Inc., No. C 18–04176, 2018 WL 5809428, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
6, 2018); Alvarez v. XPO Logistics Cartage LLC, No.: CV 18–03736, 2018 WL 
6271965, *4, *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018). But see Estrada v. FedEx Ground Packages 
Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (providing for expense reimburse-
ment). 
 141. Private Attorney General Act of 2004, 2003 Cal. Leg. Serv. ch. 906 (codified 
as amended CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (West 2018)).  
 142. See, e.g., Goro v. Flowers Foods, Inc., No. 17-CV-02580-JLS-JLB, 2018 WL 
3956018, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018); Brown v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., No. 09-
CV-03339-EJD, 2018 WL 3417483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2018); Curry v. Equilon 
Enters., LLC, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 312 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 143. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 403–04 
(Cal. 1989) (citations omitted). 
 144. Dynamex Operations W., Inc., 416 P.3d at 36. 
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On the face of it, criterion B is the factor that should prove most trouble-
some for employers who seek to show that workers maintained skills and ex-
perience that are not comparable to the skills and experience of the employees 
in their respective workforce.  Another issue may arise if the employer seeks 
to establish the independent contractor category by contracting work out to 
other employers and promoting a kind of “fissurization” – i.e., the breakup of 
tasks and functions of work previously performed by others.145 
There are uncertainties about the viability of Dynamex and its adoption of 
the ABC test as it relates to trucking.146  These cases are triggered by the 
preemption issue, which arises by virtue of the confluence of Article VI and 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution – the Supremacy Clause and the 
Commerce Clause.  These clauses provide for the dominance of federal law 
over state law on the ground that Congress has intended to displace the latter. 
The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”)147 
was enacted in 1994 to guard against backdoor attacks on the policies of de-
regulation enacted by Congress in the 1980s, which were designed to “ensure 
that the trucking industry would be shaped by competitive market forces 
against a backdrop of uniform federal regulation.”148  As a way of “com-
plet[ing] deregulation of the trucking industry,” Congress placed a preemption 
provision in the FAAAA, providing that states cannot enforce laws “relat[ing] 
to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the trans-
portation of property.”149 
 
 145. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR 
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 99–101 (2014).  Weil was the Ad-
ministrator of the Wage and Hour Division at the Department of Labor under the 
Obama Administration.  Weil was also the Peter and Deborah Wexler Professor of 
Management at Boston University Questrom School of Business until he became the 
Dean of the Heller School of Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University in 
2017. 
 146. The deregulation of the trucking industry culminated in the passage of the Mo-
tor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.  For an examination of prac-
tices and policies antedating the deregulation era, see e.g., American Trucking Ass’ns 
v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 307 (1953); J. B. GILLINGHAM, THE TEAMSTERS UNION 
ON THE WEST COAST 35–36 (1956).  See generally MICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS 
ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING DEREGULATION (2000); ESTELLE 
JAMES & RALPH C. JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS: A STUDY OF UNION POWER 
(1965); VISCELLI, supra note 73. 
 147. Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
305, 108 Stat. 1569 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 148. Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 1050–51 (7th Cir. 2016); see also 
FAAA Preemption: Clarifying the Law to Reestablish Congress’ Original Intent,  
https://www.trucking.org/F4A%20Advocacy/F4A%20Preemption%20Overveiw.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
 149. Costello, 810 F.3d at 1051; Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 
559 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2018).  
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In Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,150 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit stated that “[e]xactly where the boundary lies be-
tween permissible and impermissible state regulation is not entirely clear.”151  
In Schwann, the First Circuit was asked to determine whether individuals who 
contracted with FedEx as pick-up and delivery drivers should have been clas-
sified as employees – and therefore should have reaped the financial benefits 
of employee status, such as reimbursement of business expenses – rather than 
independent contractors according to the Massachusetts Independent Contrac-
tor Statute – a statute that adhered to the ABC test.152  The drivers argued that, 
under Massachusetts law, they should have been considered employees be-
cause FedEx could not satisfy criterion B – dealing with whether “the service 
is performed outside the usual course of business.”153 
With respect to the court’s analysis of criterion B, it noted that “the deci-
sion whether to provide a service directly, with one’s own employee, or to pro-
cure the services of an independent contractor is a significant decision in de-
signing and running a business.”154  The First Circuit concluded that because 
criterion B would mandate reimbursement for business expenses, “[t]he logical 
effect of [Massachusetts statute] would thus preclude FedEx from providing 
for first-and-last mile pick-up and delivery services through an independent 
person who bears the economic risk associated with any inefficiencies in per-
formance” because the requirement of reimbursement would indirectly dictate 
a change in its method of doing business.155  According to the court, this was 
inconsistent with the savings for employers contemplated by the deregulation 
approach.156  Accordingly, the Massachusetts statute was deemed to be 
preempted and thus unconstitutional.157 
But in Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the same could be said of any state legislation 
affecting employee rights.158  For instance, minimum wage legislation could, 
in some circumstances, constrain an employer’s ability to render a service in 
precisely the same manner as it had previously.  In Dilts, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the question of whether the Supreme Court of California’s affir-
mance of an employer obligation to provide a meal break of thirty minutes for 
workdays exceeding five hours and an additional meal break of thirty minutes 
for workdays exceeding ten hours “related to” the employer’s provision of 
 
 150. 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 151. Id. at 437. 
 152. Id. at 432; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B(a). 
 153. Costello, 813 F.3d at 433–34.  The drivers also claimed that FedEx could not 
satisfy criterion C – dealing with whether the individual is engaged in an independent 
business that is “of the same nature as that involved in the service performed.”  Id. 
 154. Id. at 438. 
 155. Id. at 439. 
 156. Id. at 439–40. 
 157. Id. at 432. 
 158. 769 F.3d 637, 648 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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routes or services.159  The court held that no preemption was triggered by the 
meal and rest break statutes because such statutes “do not set prices, mandate 
or prohibit certain routes, or tell motor carriers what services they may or may 
not provide, either directly or indirectly.”160  The Ninth Circuit was most per-
suaded by the fact that the 
carriers [would] have to take into account meal and rest [period] re-
quirements when allocating resources and scheduling routes – just as 
they must take into account state wage laws, . . . or speed limits, and 
weight restrictions . . .  – the laws do not ‘bind’ motor carriers to specific 
prices, routes or services . . . .161 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a similar con-
clusion in Costello v. Beavex, Inc. 162  The Costello case involved an Illinois 
statute that provided for the complete and timely payment of wages without 
retaliation.163  The Seventh Circuit held that criterion B itself, in contrast to the 
conclusion reached by the First Circuit in Schwann, was not preempted because 
“virtually any state law, at some level, has an effect on the market price[,] . . . 
[such as] minimum wage laws, worker-safety laws, anti-discrimination laws, 
and pension regulations[, which all] affect the cost of labor, and in turn, the 
price at which a motor carrier offers a service.”164 
The Seventh Circuit further noted that the appropriate question should be 
whether  “the cost of labor is too tenuous, remote or peripheral to have a sig-
nificant impact on . . . setting of prices . . . .”165  The thrust of the First Circuit’s 
position in Schwann, on the other hand, was to declare virtually all state labor 
laws unconstitutional on the ground that they affect price and service,166 which 
is a position that is surely inconsistent with the promotion of the collective 
bargaining process itself.167  The better view is that held by both the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits, which allows for accommodation between deregulation and 
collective bargaining. 
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit held that independent contractor-employee reg-
ulation under the standards set forth in Borello (referenced in Dynamex) was 
 
 159. Id. at 640–41.  The Supreme Court of California had affirmed this principle in 
Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court.  Id. at 642 (citing 273 P.3d 513 (2012)). 
 160. Id. at 647. 
 161. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los An-
geles, 660 F.3d 384, 397 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 162. 810 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 163. Id. at 1050. 
 164. Id. at 1053 (citations omitted) (quoting S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp. 
Corp. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 165. Id. at 1055. 
 166. Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 813 F.3d 429, 436 (1st Cir. 
2016). 
 167. See generally 29 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2018). 
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not preempted.168  But the court suggested that its reasoning was predicated 
upon the fact that the “. . . standard is neither mechanical nor inflexible; differ-
ent cases can do demand focus on different factors.”169  It stressed the point 
that Borello – not Dynamex itself – was at issue and that Dynamex “. . . did not 
purport to replace the Borello standard in every instance where a worker must 
be classified as either an independent contractor or an employee for purposes 
of enforcing California’s labor protections.”170  The unanimous panel ruling 
sounded a warning that its prior decisions had deemed legislation compelling 
uniform standards inconsistent with preemptive dictates of the FAAAA.171  
The road to state trucking regulation of independent contractor misclassifica-
tions may be a difficult one. 
Like all labor protections, Dynamex will cost employers more money and 
require either corporate savings, diminished profit margin, or increased prices.  
Realistically, the Dynamex decision promotes the dignity of workers who de-
sire both flexibility, which can be properly afforded to employees themselves, 
and the reduction of inequality that so often accompanies the independent con-
tractor status. 
But there are more troubles ahead; the most prominent of them being the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems, which could com-
pletely eviscerate Dynamex through “unbargained-for” waivers of the right to 
bring class actions. 
2. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 
The most formidable obstacle to the success of the Dynamex decision may 
lie in the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Epic Systems Corp. v. 
Lewis172 – a case that will undercut the rights of workers through employer-
promulgated and employer-imposed binding dispute resolution systems,173 
notwithstanding the consequences of the holding in Dynamex.  In Epic Systems, 
several employees filed a class action lawsuit in federal court, alleging that 
their employer violated FLSA and related state law.174  Under the NLRA, em-
ployees are afforded the right to protest together and engage in concerted ac-
tivity.175  However, despite this NLRA protection, a 5-4 majority of the Court 
 
      168. Ca. Trucking Ass’n v. Su, 903 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 169. Id. at 959.  
 170. Id. at 967 n.4. 
 171. See, e.g., Californians For Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Men-
donca, 152 F.3d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1998).  The Dynamex preemption issue appears 
to be directly presented by Western States Trucking Ass’n v. Andre Schoorl, No. 2:18-
cv-01989, 2018 WL 5920148 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2018).  
 172. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1620. 
 175. See id. at 1628 (citing NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)). 
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held that the FAA176 forbade the employees from pursuing such litigation be-
cause they had entered into an agreement, required as a condition of employ-
ment, with the employer that provided for “individual” arbitration to resolve 
all employments disputes and prohibited class actions in court or arbitration.177 
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, writing for the majority, held that (1) the NLRA 
protection of concerted activity did not cover protests involving class actions 
and (2) the FAA was instructive to federal courts regarding the enforcement of 
such arbitration agreements.178  In so holding, Justice Gorsuch reasoned that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the NLRA provides employees the “rights to or-
ganize unions and bargain collectively, . . . [the NLRA] says nothing about 
how judges and arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the workplace and 
enter the courtroom or arbitral forum.”179  The Court held that the focus of the 
NLRA was upon the right to organize unions and to bargain collectively.180  
The Court also noted that “[u]nion organization and collective bargaining in 
the workplace are the bread and butter of the NLRA, while the particulars of 
dispute resolution procedures” are found elsewhere.181  But collective protest 
over working conditions is the bread and butter of the NLRA as well.  The 
practical significance of this protest is to protect employees against discipline 
and discharge when they work together and speak out over conditions, such as 
the rate of wages or other conditions of employment, that they deem to be un-
fair or inequitable.  
The Court emphasized its precedent regarding the FAA that allowed these 
individualized proceedings to prevail over NLRA protections.182  The Court in 
Epic Systems remained deliberately deaf to the realities of workplace litiga-
tion.183  
Justice Ginsburg dissented persuasively on behalf of three other members 
of the Court: Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor, and Jus-
tice Elena Kagan.184  Her dissent constituted a vigorous, frontal attack on the 
class action waiver that gave rise to the litigation.  Justice Ginsburg noted that 
the “claims [involving minimum wage and maximum hour alleged violations 
 
 176. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2018). 
 177. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1630. 
 181. Id. at 1627. 
 182. See id. at 1621–22 (citing Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 
233 (2013) and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)); see 
also William B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court, Job Discrimination, Affirmative Action, 
Globalization, and Class Actions: Justice Ginsburg’s Term, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 371, 
391–96  (2014). 
183. This was notwithstanding the argument made that individual claims could not 
be pursued on an individual basis because of cost ineffectiveness as it would 
cost more to litigate than could be obtained from the relief itself.  See Epic Sys. Corp., 
138 S. Ct. at 1622–23.  
 184. See id. at 1633–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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of the FLSA] . . . [we]re small, scarcely of a size warranting the expense of 
seeking redress alone.”185  Justice Ginsburg said, “For workers striving to gain 
from their employers decent terms and conditions of employment, there is 
strength in numbers.  A single employee, Congress understood, is disarmed in 
dealing with an employer.”186 
Her dissent explained the basis for the rise of labor legislation in the 
1930s, which was designed to end inequality between the worker and the em-
ployer.187  It highlighted the fact that the FAA used by the majority required 
plaintiffs to proceed one by one.188  The FAA was used by the majority, over 
the objections of the dissent, to allow for a take-it-or-leave-it arbitration, in-
cluding the collective litigation abstinence demanded therein.189  Justice Gins-
burg emphasized that employees could only effectively tackle working condi-
tions that labor law regards as inequitable and unacceptable by banding to-
gether to protest through litigation and other means.190  It was wrong, said the 
dissent, for the majority to subordinate the NLRA and its relevant right to en-
gage in “concerted activities”;191 however, this was a point the majority in Epic 
Systems virtually ignored. 
The dissent also addressed the point that arbitration provisions of this kind 
are unrelated to employment contracts and opined that “in relatively recent 
years, the Court’s Arbitration Act decisions have taken many wrong turns.”192  
Justice Ginsburg maintained that the dynamics of the arbitration provision im-
balance create a scenario wherein employers can risk violations of employment 
law statutes while knowing that workers in most instances are not in a position 
to protest because they could not do so collectively.193  Beyond what was ex-
plicitly stated in the dissent, class actions are also important because they pro-
vide for enforcement of employment law through the “private attorney general” 
when government enforcement is ineffectual due to inadequate funding, iner-
tia, or hostility.194 
And the ramifications of this power imbalance are even deeper than what 
Justice Ginsburg set forth.  For example, when the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas 
hearings took place in the spring of 1991, Justice Clarence Thomas was being 
 
 185. Id. at 1633. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 1634–35. 
 188. Id. at 1645–48; see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 
(2011). 
 189. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1623 (majority opinion); id. at 1642–43 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1645. 
 193. Id. at 1646–48. 
 194. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (dis-
cussing bringing a suit under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the plaintiff acts 
“not [only] for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general’ vindicating a policy 
that Congress considered of the highest priority”). 
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confirmed as a member of the United States Supreme Court.195  Ms. Hill was 
repeatedly interrogated about sexual harassment allegations that she made 
against Justice Thomas and was also asked why she had not filed an unlawful 
employment practice charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission.196  In my judgment, the reason Ms. Hill did not file such a charge is 
likely because a remedy could not be obtained for a violation beyond a mere 
cease-and-desist requirement unless a demotion, re-assignment, or dismissal 
was involved. 
This reality helped build momentum for the civil rights movement in 1991 
and culminated in an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,197 
which provided greater damage recovery that went above and beyond the tra-
ditional back pay employment remedy for sex discrimination and sexual har-
assment claims, such as compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attor-
neys’ fees.198  The availability of such relief, alongside the common law 
wrongful discharge actions that had emerged in many states during the 1980s, 
created significant liability for employers and increased their desire to be im-
munized from such exposure.199 
The answer for employers wanting to limit their liability was the em-
ployer’s adoption of arbitration clauses – or, in the words of Justice Ginsburg, 
“unbargained-for” contracts.200  Employers promulgated unlawful discharge 
procedures to shield themselves from juries – a forum that employers deem 
inhospitable.201  The reality of the workplace relationship and the significance 
of the Court’s holding in Epic Systems for employer-employee disputes is well-
chronicled in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.202  But the need to fill in 
the gap, as illustrated by Ms. Hill’s testimony, was not explicitly referenced in 
the 1991 amendment.203 
At least two other issues of importance are raised by the Epic Systems 
decision.  The first is that is it unclear whether Epic Systems endorses the view 
that arbitration agreements are categorically enforceable as a matter of public 
policy.  For example, the plaintiffs in O’Connor v. Uber204  maintained that 
 
 195. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 383 (5th ed. 
2013). 
 196. See Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The “Unwelcome” Require-
ment in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1559 n.8 (1992). 
 197. Marcia D. Greenberger, What Anita Hill Did for America, CNN (Oct. 22, 
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/10/21/greenberger.anita.hill/index.html; 
see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat 1071 (codified as amended 
by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018)). 
 198. Id. § 1981a. 
 199. See GOULD, supra note 195, at 420–28. 
 200. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648–49 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). 
 201. See id. at 1647 n.15. 
 202. See id. at 1646–49. 
 203. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. 
 204. 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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class certification of drivers who have opted out of arbitration or ended their 
work prior to the implementation of an arbitration clause may be appropriate 
prior to the determination of the enforceability of the clause with regards to 
those who had accepted it.205  Uber maintained that Dynamex has no applica-
bility to that litigation because the O’Connor case did not involve a wage order 
but rather another provision of the California Labor Code – an issue which will 
come back to the Supreme Court of California in the future.206  Class action 
determinations could still sweep in those who have not signed an arbitration 
agreement with those who have, thus enhancing the leverage of both groups. 
The second is that the FAA at issue in Epic Systems does not apply to 
transportation employees.207 But this is limited in scope.  In the first place, the 
narrower pre-New Deal reliance upon commerce excludes a narrow band of 
transportation workers from the clutches of Epic Systems.208  The worker, ra-
ther than products or goods handled, must himself or herself be in interstate 
commerce.209  Are independent contractors and employees covered by the 
transportation exemption?  The United States Supreme Court, in New Prime, 
Inc. v. Oliveira,210 has held that both groups are covered by the exemption.  
The Court stated:  
 
 205. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 2 n.4, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 13-3826-EMC), 2015 WL 
12777254.  A number of courts have adopted this approach.  See id. (listing eight court 
decisions). 
 206. Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Cer-
tification at 11–12 n.3, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. CV 13-3826-EMC). 
 207. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1644 (2018).  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that Epic Systems eliminates plaintiffs’ claims 
in O’Connor.  “Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems, we obtained 
supplemental briefings from the parties. Plaintiffs acknowledged that the Court’s deci-
sion extinguished their argument that the arbitration agreements were not enforceable 
under the NLRA.” O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1094 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
208. Section 1 of the FAA states that “nothing herein shall apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce.”  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).  Therefore, transportation is part 
of the FAA §1 exemption. 
      209. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the United States Supreme Court stated,  
 
When the FAA was enacted in 1925 . . . the phrase “engaged in commerce” was 
not a term of art indicating a limited assertion of congressional jurisdiction; to 
the contrary, it is said, the formulation came close to expressing the outer limits 
of Congress’ power as then understood . . . .  Were this mode of interpretation 
to prevail, we would take into account the scope of the Commerce Clause, as 
then elaborated by the Court, at the date of the FAA's enactment in order to 
interpret what the statute means now.  
 
532 U.S. 105, 116 (2001) (citations omitted). 
      210. 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). 
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/9
2018] DYNAMEX IS DYNAMITE 1019 
[In 1925] . . . most people then would have understood §1 to exclude 
not only agreements between employers and employees but also agree-
ments that require independent contractors to perform work. 
. . . This Court’s early 20th-century cases used the phrase ‘contract of 
employment’ to describe work agreements involving independent con-
tractors . . . . 
 . . . [T]he evidence before us remains that, as dominantly understood 
in 1925, a contract of employment did not necessarily imply the exist-
ence of an employer-employee or master-servant relationship.211 
Accordingly, such truckers, so frequently characterized as independent con-
tractors in the deregulation era, now have the right to sue for employment contract 
violations in federal courts of general jurisdiction, notwithstanding the Epic Sys-
tems holding.212  Oliveira makes it clear that some transportation workers, in-
cluding independent contractors, are not swept up by the Epic Systems pro-
nouncements. 
This ruling will have a major impact upon the gig economy, given the 
large number of transportation employees who are located within it.  It could 
touch upon both the FAA coverage of transportation and its workers who are 
admittedly independent contractors or characterized as such. 
In addition to Oliviera, another possible Epic Systems escape route has 
been adumbrated in California challenges to the Uber-independent contractor 
classification under the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), which 
protects a competitor who has been injured by unlawful or unfair conduct.  
Here, plaintiffs have taken the position that their employment of drivers as em-
ployees performing the same tasks as Uber’s independent contractors at infe-
rior wages has placed plaintiffs at a competitive disadvantage.213  This gets at 
the same problem from which workers sought relief in Epic Systems – but in 
the form of a competitor’s action based upon unfair competition.214 
 
      211. Id. at 539–40, 542 (alteration in original). 
      212. The Court in Oliveira did not address state arbitration laws, though it is possi-
ble that they may be preempted.  AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
      213. Class Action Complaint for Violation of the California Unfair Competition 
Law and the California Unfair Practices Act, Diva Limousine Ltd. v. Uber Techs., Inc. 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-05546-EMC). 
 214. The Complaint emphasizes the fact that Uber has hemorrhaged money mount-
ing into considerable losses but that this has not dissuaded investors who expect returns 
when the TNC competitors are eliminated by virtue of the above referenced practices. 
Id. 
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3. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle 
The third area, which involves an entirely different approach undertaken 
by local government, has accepted the assertion by employers that drivers in 
the ridesharing and taxicab industries are independent contractors and therefore 
states and local governments have jurisdiction to enact collective bargaining 
legislation.  Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle215 involved comprehen-
sive legislation enacted in the form of an ordinance by the City of Seattle that 
provided a collective bargaining process for for-hire vehicles and taxis, some 
of which operate through platforms like Uber and Lyft.216  Seattle is the first 
city to have enacted this kind of legislation.217  The ordinance  
cover[ed] any company that sells a ride, whether it be through an app[li-
cation (“app”)], a dispatch, curb calling, hailing on the street, or a flat 
rate.  It was enacted on December 14, 2015, by the Seattle City Council.  
[Because the City of Seattle realized that] the unilateral imposition of 
contracts upon drivers as well as unilateral changes in their wages and 
working conditions could ‘adversely impact the ability of a for-hire 
driver to provide transportation services in a safe, reliable, stable, cost-
effective and economically viable manner,’ Seattle . . . provided these 
drivers with an opportunity for union representation and collective bar-
gaining . . . . 218 
. . .  The ordinance also provide[d] that, in the seeking of representation, 
the union is entitled to obtain from the “driver coordinators” the names, 
contact information, and license numbers of drivers so that the union 
can solicit their interest and obtain, if possible, majority support for the 
purpose of bargaining . . . . [The ordinance further provided that, i]n the 
event that the parties are unsuccessful at negotiating a collective bar-
gaining agreement, either side may initiate arbitration of their differ-
ences, which has a binding effect, so long as local government approval 
of the award is obtained.219 
The Chamber of Commerce challenged the lawfulness of the ordinance 
on both federal antitrust and labor law grounds.220  The Chamber argued that 
the ordinance violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”) be-
cause it sanctioned “price-fixing of ride-referral service fees by private cartels 
of independent-contractor drivers.”221  The Chamber further argued that the 
 
 215. 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 216. Id. at 775. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Gould, supra note 66, at 123 (footnotes omitted). 
 219. Id. at 123–24 (footnotes omitted). 
 220. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 775. 
 221. Id. 
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ordinance was preempted by both the Sherman Act and the NLRA.222  The 
district court found that neither the Sherman Act – by reason of the state-action 
immunity doctrine – nor the NLRA preempted the ordinance, and the Chamber 
appealed.223 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, proceeding upon the 
assumption that the ordinance would authorize a per se antitrust violation, re-
versed the district court’s dismissal of the antitrust claim under the state-action 
immunity doctrine first announced by the United States Supreme Court in Par-
ker v. Brown.224  In Parker, as the Ninth Circuit noted, the Court held that 
Congress did not intend to restrict the sovereign capacity of states to regulate 
their economies and further held that the Sherman Act “should not be read to 
bar [s]tates from imposing market restraints ‘as an act of government.’”225  The 
Ninth Circuit echoed what it characterized as the United States Supreme 
Court’s disfavor of such immunity by stating, “State-action immunity is the 
exception rather than the rule.”226 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court “uses a 
two-part test” to determine whether exemption from antitrust liability can be 
established: “[F]irst, the challenged restraint [must] be one clearly articulated 
and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and second, “the policy [must] be 
actively supervised by the [s]tate.’”227 
With respect to the first prong of the test, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
“[t]he state’s authorization must be plain and clear . . . .”228  The displacement 
of competition through a regulatory structure is the policy that a state must 
clearly articulate.229  The Ninth Circuit, by a unanimous three-judge panel, held 
that the first prong – the clear articulation requirement – had not been satisfied 
in Chamber of Commerce because, given that the ridesharing industry was not 
 
 222. Id. at 779 (citing Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations 
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 
U.S. 236 (1959)).  See generally William B. Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline and 
Threshold of “Litigating Elucidation”, 39 U. DETROIT L.J. 539 (1962). 
 223. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 776. 
 224. Id. at 781 (citing 317 U.S. 341 (1943)). 
 225. Id. (quoting FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 224 
(2013)).  “Following Parker, the [United States] Supreme Court has, ‘under certain 
circumstances,’ extended immunity from federal antitrust laws to ‘nonstate actors car-
rying out the State’s regulatory program.’”  Id. (quoting Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 
Inc., 568 U.S. at 224–25). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 782 (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)).  This “two-part test [is] sometimes referred to as the 
Midcal test.”  Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 782–83 (citing S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 
471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985)). 
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yet in existence, it could not be said that the Washington legislature contem-
plated the for-hire drivers to “price fix” their compensation.230  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that the legislature, in focusing upon pri-
vately operated transportation services, was not concerned with “the contrac-
tual payment arrangements between for-hire drivers and driver coordinators  
for use of the latter’s smartphone apps or ride-referral services.”231  This rea-
soning that emphasizes statutory construction has persuaded no other tribunal 
in the United States or in Europe confronted with a similar issue.232  The court, 
in arriving at its conclusion that the clear articulation requirement had not been 
satisfied, stated, 
Although driver coordinators like Uber and Lyft contract with providers 
of transportation services, they do not fulfill the requests for transpor-
tation services – the drivers do.  Nothing in the statute evinces a clearly 
articulated state policy to displace competition in the market for ride-
referral service fees charged by companies like Uber, Lyft, and 
Eastside.  In other words, although the statute addresses the provision 
of transportation services, it is silent on the issue of compensation con-
tracts between for-hire drivers and driver coordinators. 
. . . . 
. . . [A]lthough the State of Washington authorized municipalities to 
regulate the for-hire transportation services industry at large, the stat-
utes do not indicate that the state adopted a policy authorizing for-hire 
drivers to fix the rates Uber and Lyft charge for use of their ride-referral 
apps.233 
This theme pervades the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on the clearly articulated 
prong of the Parker state sovereignty test.  Simply, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
Uber and Lyft were not in existence when the Washington statute was en-
acted.234  But the court noted that “the fact that technology has advanced leaps 
and bounds beyond the contemplation of the state legislature is not, on its own, 
the dispositive factor in our holding today.”235  Modern technological advances 
may not have been a dispositive factor in the court’s defense of its own opinion; 
yet, when one looks at the totality of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, it appears 
 
 230. Id. at 783. 
 231. Id. at 784. 
 232. See, e.g., Case C-320/16, Uber France SAS v. Bensalem (Apr. 10, 2018), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=192325&pageIn-
dex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1610202;  The British 
Council v. Jeffrey [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2253 (Eng.). 
 233. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 784–86. 
 234. Id. at 787. 
 235. Id. 
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that, to paraphrase Shakespeare, “[t]he lady doth protest too much, me-
thinks.”236 
The court held that the second prong – the active supervision requirement 
– was also not satisfied in Chamber of Commerce because active supervision 
had to exist at the state level rather than the municipal level.237  Therefore, 
because the Seattle ordinance only possessed active supervision at the munici-
pal level, the court held the active supervision requirement was not met.238  The 
Ninth Circuit stated, “Sovereign capacity matters.”239  Moreover, in the court’s 
view, because private parties had “substantial discretion” in setting the terms 
of municipal regulation, the act of state supervision must be shown in the cir-
cumstances, notwithstanding the fact that no agreement could be entered into 
– let alone certified – without the City of Seattle’s approval.240 
The soundest portion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion lies in its handling of 
the preemption issue.  The district court held that the congressional decision to 
exclude independent contractors did not “implicitly” preempt state or local la-
bor regulation of independent contractors.241  The Ninth Circuit, like the dis-
trict court, relied on the cases holding that the exclusion of farm workers242 and 
domestic employees243 from federal law allowed for state regulation and noted 
that the preemption of state legislation relating to supervisors was predicated 
upon the peculiar NLRA language relating to them.244  Accordingly, the court 
rejected the Chamber’s contention that the ordinance was preempted under Ma-
chinists preemption245 because, given the explicit instruction to exclude inde-
 
 236. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2. 
 237. Id. at 789–90. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 789. 
 240. Id. at 790. 
 241. Id. at 791, 793. 
 242. Id. at 793; see also Villegas v. Princeton Farms, Inc., 893 F.2d 919, 921 (7th 
Cir. 1990); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Jones, 430 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Minn. 1977) 
(“[T]here is no legislative history to indicate that the NLRA’s exclusion of agricultural 
laborers from its coverage was intended to leave the area totally free from regulation 
and because that exclusion standing alone is to be understood to mean that federal pol-
icy is indifferent, . . . the court has concluded that state regulation has not been 
preempted . . . .”).  See generally William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Contem-
porary Issues in California Farm Labor, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1243, 1271–72 (2017) 
(discussing the coverage of agricultural laborers).  “[S]tates remain free to legislate as 
they see fit.”  Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 793 (quoting United Farm Workers 
of Am. v. Ariz. Agric. Emp’t Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 243. Id.; see also Greene v. Dayton, 806 F.3d. 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 244. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 793–94. 
 245. Id. at 790–94; see also Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Re-
lations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).  “Machinists preemption forbids both the . . . 
[NLRB] and [s]tates to regulate conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated be-
cause left to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.”  Chamber of Com-
merce, 890 F.3d at 790 (citations omitted). 
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pendent contractors, “the [o]rdinance regulates economic activity that Con-
gress intended to remain unregulated and left to the forces of the free mar-
ket.”246 
The Ninth Circuit also considered whether the ordinance was preempted 
under Garmon preemption but ultimately held that it was not.247  In Garmon, 
the United States Supreme Court held that if a subject matter is deemed “‘ar-
guably’ protected or prohibited,” it is preempted.248  The Ninth Circuit held 
that Garmon preemption could be found if the NLRB could address the issue 
of whether the drivers were employees in the future and rejected the Chamber’s 
argument that the ordinance should be deemed preempted under Garmon until 
the NLRB decides the issue.249 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Chamber, “without citing any authority,” 
claimed that there was no need for it to take a position on the status of drivers 
or to provide any evidence because the proceedings before the NLRB on em-
ployee status were “ongoing” to make out preemption.250  The Ninth Circuit 
noted that one of the most instructive cases regarding the issue of preemption 
is ILA v. Davis,251 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that preemp-
tion was not established as a “conclusory assertion.”252  Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit held that, as in Davis, preemption could not be found simply because 
an issue before the NLRB had not been decided by it.253  However, the question 
in Davis of whether an individual was properly excluded as a supervisor was 
one exclusively of fact, whereas the independent contractor issue involving 
drivers involves both a conclusion of law as well as fact.254  The Ninth Circuit 
rendered this difference between the two cases relatively meaningless, how-
ever.  It stated, 
Practically speaking, the question of whether drivers who contract with 
Uber and Lyft are employees or independent contractors may well be a 
“live issue” in other judicial and administrative proceedings involving 
different parties, claims, and law.  But that does not absolve the Cham-
ber from complying with our case law regarding Garmon preemp-
tion.255 
 
 246. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 791. 
 247. Id. at 794–95; see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 
(1959). 
 248. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 794 (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n 
v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 394 (1986)). 
 249. Id. at 795. 
 250. Id. 
 251. 476 U.S. 380. 
 252. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 794 (quoting Davis, 476 U.S. at 394). 
 253. Id. at 795. 
 254. Gould, supra note 66, at 138–39. 
 255. Chamber of Commerce, 890 F.3d at 795. 
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One difficulty with the employers’ position under Garmon, while arguing 
for preemption at the local level, was that in asserting its position before the 
NLRB, the employers were arguing two positions inconsistent with one an-
other, depending upon the forum.  The last thing that employers wished to do 
in Chamber of Commerce was put forward evidence showing that the drivers 
were arguably employees, as a conclusion by the NLRB that the drivers were 
employees would not have been desirable from the employers’ perspective. 
The most important practical upshot of this aspect of Chamber of Com-
merce is that states willing to enact legislation providing for collective bargain-
ing for independent contractors now have a roadmap to do so.  Even though 
some of the Ninth Circuit’s antitrust analysis rests on a wobbly edifice, super-
vision can be designated to the municipal level, though the politics of obtaining 
statewide legislation would be more considerable given that the voices of an-
tiregulation are louder outside the cities.  Preemption, if it had been found by 
the Ninth Circuit, could have put any state and local legislation out of business.  
As a direct result of the Chamber of Commerce decision, states like California, 
for instance, have a roadmap for how to proceed and may assert jurisdiction in 
light of the preemption analysis provided in Chamber of Commerce. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Dynamex is a landmark decision of considerable importance.  The busi-
ness community, however, may have underestimated its ace in the hole – that 
is, individualized and, in Justice Ginsburg’s words, “unbargained-for” con-
tracts that make it impossible for employees to benefit from decisions like Dy-
namex.  True, the Court has thus far left unresolved the issue of exemption for 
transportation employees in the gig economy.  Are transportation employees 
exempt from the Court’s unwavering promotion of employer- promulgated ar-
bitration?  Does the exemption extend to both independent contractors as well 
as employees?  This Article shows that two decades of FAA jurisprudence 
clearly provide for the exemption.  The practical significance of the exemption 
would allow holdings like Dynamex to flourish – as they should – and would 
provide dignity and protection for workers in the gig economy. 
Finally, although Chamber of Commerce has less immediate impact than 
either Dynamex or Epic Systems, the Chamber of Commerce decision sketches 
an outline for any state to enact relatively comprehensive collective bargaining 
legislation for the benefit of drivers whom companies claim to be independent 
contractors,256 particularly if the NLRB under President Trump’s Administra-
 
 256. Some have argued that the legislative answer lies in the creation of a new or 
third classification for “independent workers” in the gig economy.  See SETH D. HARRIS 
& ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR 
LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 5 (2015), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_la-
bor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf.  But the better view is 
that articulated by Professors Miriam Cherry and Antonio Alosi who have persuasively 
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tion adopts the employer position and characterizes such drivers as independ-
ent contractors.257 Perhaps an intermediate compromise would allow, as in 
Denmark, for the workers to choose their status at a particular time.258 The 
ultimate irony could be that the Chamber of Commerce decision adds to the 
cause of reformers who seek to bring the rights of labor to state government – 
rights that are so often excluded by the doctrine of preemption. 
 
argued that a third category should not be created given the inevitable litigation about 
these boundaries and given the fact that doing so would “result in downgrading em-
ployees to intermediate status, [which] would do nothing to eliminate the problem of 
bogus contractor status.”  Miriam A. Cherry and Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contrac-
tors” in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 678 
(2017). 
 257. Cf. William B. Gould IV, Politics and the Effect on the National Labor Rela-
tions Board’s Adjudicative and Rulemaking Processes, 64 EMORY L.J. 1501, 1526 
(2015) (“The amount and extent of political interference has increased substantially 
since the 1990s and promises to do so again given the composition of Congress in 2015 
and beyond.  Congress, now encouraged and prompted by the Congressional Review 
Act, seems now to be almost obsessed with the view that it is the expert, not the 
[NLRB], and that its role is to instruct the [NLRB] about what to do.” (footnote omit-
ted)).  
 258. Sarah O’Connor, Uber and Lyft’s Valuations Expose the Gig Economy to 
Scrutiny, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/49650d32-
0c48-11e9-acdc-4d9976f1533b (“There is a way out. Last year, a Danish gig economy 
company called Hilfr, which sends cleaners to private homes, signed an innovative col-
lective agreement with the 3F union.  After 100 hours of work on the app, Hilfr workers 
become covered automatically by the agreement, which gives them a minimum wage, 
sick pay and pension contributions.  If they prefer, workers can opt out and continue to 
work as freelancers.  This solution might not be directly transferrable to other [labor] 
markets.  But it is a reminder that the benefits delivered by gig companies – speed, 
flexibility, transparency – are not incompatible with giving workers employment pro-
tections.”).  
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